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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 21 September 1950
To : 27 September 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
28 September 1950

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JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. There are no firm indications of Soviet or Chinese Communist intentions to intervene actively in the Korean conflict. The U.S.S.R. may be preparing to propose a political solution in Korea.
- c. Viet Minh attacks on French border posts are probably preparatory to a general offensive but the present phase of operations may be prolonged for several months.
- d. Increased harassment of the Western Powers in Germany may be a preliminary to a new Soviet move in Berlin but there are no firm indications of Soviet intentions.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.—See current situation reports. There is no reliable information to indicate Soviet or Chinese Communist preparations to intervene in Korea. Soviet political activity and propaganda suggest that the U.S.S.R. would not react violently to the defeat of the North Korean forces.
- b. CHINA.—No unusual military activity has been observed opposite the coast of Formosa and there have been an increasing number of reports of varying degrees of reliability that the Chinese Communists have abandoned the attack for this year. Weather conditions are making an invasion attempt increasingly difficult although the weather will not be too unfavorable the next few weeks.

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- c. INDO-CHINA.--Apparent French acceptance of the loss of two border posts and possible preparations for a withdrawal from Laos indicate that the French are taking a more serious view of present Viet Minh operations. The tempo of Viet Minh attacks will probably continue to increase in preparation for a general offensive. There is no indication of overt Chinese Communist participation.
- d. GERMANY.--Soviet harassment of Western activities in Berlin has again been intensified but it cannot be determined whether this is a preliminary to more drastic action. Intensive Soviet military training activity continues in Germany but there is little evidence of unusual military preparations.
- e. HUNGARY.--Barracks construction and other previously reported activity may indicate preparations for the arrival of additional Soviet troops in Hungary. The Hungarian Army is conducting division-scale maneuvers for the first time since the war.
- f. EASTERN EUROPE.--There are reliable indications that almost all the Eastern European Satellite Armies are being increased in strength this year and that in some countries additional units have been or are being formed.
- g. IRAN.--Soviet logistical preparations on the Iranian-Turkish border apparently have been increased during recent months and additional reports suggest a possible increase in troop strength along the Iranian border. The significance of this activity is not clear although at least some of the movement is probably connected with maneuvers.

3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--No significant change is evident during the period. The capabilities of the Eastern European Satellite forces are gradually increasing.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
27 September 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. There continue to be no reliable indications that the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Communists intend an active intervention in the Korean conflict, and there are suggestions that the Soviets would be willing to consider a political solution to the Korean problem.

(1) There is a continuing lack of information on Soviet military or other activity in the Far East which would be indicative of an intent to reoccupy North Korea. Unconfirmed reports [redacted] have stated that Soviet jet and four-engine bombers are in Mukden and Chiamussu, Manchuria but there is no reliable evidence of a Soviet air or ground build-up in Manchuria. Recent Soviet political activity, apparently designed to seek early termination of hostilities, and the failure of the U.S.S.R. to intervene in the face of North Korean reverses suggest that the Soviets would not react violently in case of the defeat of North Korean forces. Soviet representatives at the United Nations General Assembly have not only shown an unusually conciliatory attitude but Soviet diplomats have made unusual efforts to minimize the importance of the Korean war. The Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegates to the United Nations have remarked that an effort should be made to end hostilities in Korea, that perhaps North Korea would soon make such an offer, and that by Soviet standards the war is a small and unimportant affair. There are no firm indications as yet, however, that North Korean forces are preparing for an early termination of hostilities.

(2) There is no new information indicative of Chinese Communist intentions to intervene in Korea except for the possible continuing release of Koreans from the Chinese Communist forces to North Korea.

b. Aerial reconnaissance has continued to reveal no unusual military activity along the invasion coast opposite Formosa. Although weather conditions during the next few weeks will not be too unfavorable, conditions during the winter months would make an amphibious operation across the Straits most difficult but not absolutely impossible.

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A press report of the blackout of the Fukien and Chekiang coastal ports and of evacuation of women and children has been discounted, except that there is evidence of defensive measures in Swatow, possibly as a result of aerial reconnaissance of the area. There have been an increasing number of reports that the Chinese Communists have abandoned the attack on Formosa for this year and, according to unconfirmed reports, Communist officials have indicated that no action would be taken which would prejudice Communist China's possible entry into the United Nations.

c. Additional rumors that the Chinese Communists have acquired submarines from the U.S.S.R. remain unconfirmed. There is also no firm information to support persistent rumors that the U.S.S.R. is establishing a submarine base at Yulin on Hainan Island, but this possibility cannot be discounted entirely.

d. In Indo-China, there are indications that the French are taking a more sober view of the gravity of the present Viet Minh threat in Tonkin; two minor border posts have been abandoned and the French are considering a voluntary withdrawal from Laokay which guards the Red River Valley approach to Hanoi from Yunnan. Such a development would reverse the earlier French stand that the Dong Khe operation was of only local significance. Further Viet Minh attacks against French posts can be expected at any time and there has been some increase in guerrilla activity in other parts of Indo-China. It is believed that present attacks are probably the preparatory phase of a general offensive but that this phase may well be prolonged for several months. In a recent reassessment of the situation, the British Foreign and War Offices expressed the opinion that a general Viet Minh offensive in the near future is not unlikely. This opinion is based on several reports: (1) the Yunnan-Indo-China highway is nearing completion (contrary to previous reports); (2) present roads could support 300,000 troops on the Indo-China border; (3) work on the airfield in southern Hainan is being carried forward urgently; (4) Viet Minh are now in possession of light AA and field guns and possibly of medium artillery; and (5) there has been a considerable shifting of Chinese Communist forces resulting in a concentration at Nanning near the Indo-China border. There is still no indication of overt Chinese Communist participation in current Viet Minh operations.

e. There have been no reports of additional Chinese Communist troop movements towards Tibet proper and military action probably is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of Sino-Tibetan political negotiations.

f. In the Philippines, the Huks are more active than in previous years, following a gradual expansion of their areas of operation during 1949-50. There have been reports of planned Huk attacks against such comparatively isolated U. S. installations as the Voices of America transmitter. The Huks have the capability of attacking such targets despite current Government countermeasures.

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g. There are no firm indications of additional Communist pressure on Hong Kong, Burma or Thailand.

h. A lack of complete Soviet civil air defense preparations in the Far East is suggested by the fact that the city of Vladivostok did not black out recently on the approach of U.S. reconnaissance planes. On the other hand, the city of Dairen did black out last March on the approach of a U.S. plane.

i. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) The U.S.S.R. may be preparing to accept a political solution in Korea. There are no firm indications of Soviet or Chinese Communist intentions to intervene militarily in the Korean conflict.
- (2) There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa and it is increasingly likely that the Communist plans for an attack has been revised.
- (3) Viet Minh attacks on French border posts are probably the preparatory phase of a general offensive but present small-scale operations may continue for several months.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. In Germany, there are indications of continuing intensive training activities of Soviet ground and air units and of slight further increases in new equipment and supplies, but there have been no reports of other unusual military preparations. The conversion to jet aircraft in the Soviet Zone is continuing to increase, with a total of 389 jets now reported. Increasing flight training was noted during early September, an apparently normal development for this time of year. Soviet Army units are reported to have conducted fairly extensive river crossing exercises recently on the Elbe River. A slight increase in stockpiling of ammunition and of gasoline supplies in the southwestern portion of the Zone is indicated, but there have been no reports of a general excessive build-up of Soviet fuel reserves in Germany although large stocks are normally maintained.

b. There has been a recent intensification of Soviet efforts to harass the position of the Western Powers in Berlin, including the cutting off of electricity to the West Sectors of Berlin, an attempt by the Soviets to seize a small bit of territory in the British sector, the kidnapping of two American MP's, and further interference with inter-zonal barge traffic. Whether these measures are a preliminary to some more drastic action in Berlin is undetermined; but if the U.S.S.R. feels some necessity for action to offset a defeat in Korea, Berlin would be a logical point for such action. A further possible indication that

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some unusual Soviet action in Germany may be planned in the near future is an unconfirmed report that East Zone railways were ordered by the Soviets to be fully mobilized for any eventuality by 1 October. Whether this is merely a further effort to improve the efficiency of the railways or in preparation for some unusual rail activity is not known.

c. The Hungarian Army is conducting its first division-scale maneuvers since the war in the southern portion of the country both east and west of the Danube. There is no evidence of Soviet participation in these maneuvers other than the presence of some Soviet officer observers. Reliable observations continue to indicate that extensive barracks construction is under way at a number of locations in Hungary which do not now house Hungarian troops, and the possibility cannot be discounted that some of these barracks are intended for additional Soviet troops as well as for an enlarged Hungarian Army. Other developments which have suggested that the U.S.S.R. may intend a reinforcement of Hungary have been the previously reported movement from Austria to the Budapest area of small elements of the Central Group of Forces, the transfer of depots from Austria to Hungary, and persistent rumors that preparations are being made for the arrival of Soviet troops in southeastern Hungary. A recent report of the arrival of nine Soviet regiments in Hungary via Rumania is not confirmed by other information presently available.

d. Reports during the past several months indicate that almost all the Eastern European Satellite armies are being increased in strength this year. In Poland, there are good indications that a two-class call-up will occur this autumn. There is no information on concurrent releases. There are hints of a possible Army expansion in Czechoslovakia, including the arrival of an enlarged Soviet training mission and new barracks construction, but firm information on expansion is lacking. In Hungary, available evidence definitely points to a continued expansion of the Hungarian Army; at least one new rifle division has been formed, and there is a possibility that two classes will be called up this autumn. Rumania called up two age groups last year and may call up two more this year. A new Rumanian law has extended the period of service for technical personnel from two to three years and there are indications of the formation of additional Rumanian army units. In Bulgaria, the 1930 class, which was due for call-up this autumn, now appears definitely to have been called up this summer, and there are no indications of releases from the Bulgarian Army. The formation of an additional infantry division in the Bulgarian Army this year has already been accepted and the tank brigade in the Sofia area has possibly been expanded to a division. The scant available information on Albania suggests a similar trend in that country.

e. Recent reports of undetermined reliability suggest that Soviet troop strength on the Iranian border west of the Caspian Sea has been increased during recent months, with concentrations reported

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
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particularly in the areas of Lenkoran and Nakhichevan. A recent increase in Soviet air activity along the Turkish border, including flights of jet aircraft, has also been reported. [redacted] the concentration at Lenkoran, reported as 30,000 to 40,000 troops, to be probably true. Unconfirmed reports allege that small groups of Kurds are being infiltrated into the interior of Iran. New road construction along the Soviet border just west of the Caspian and the movement of supplies into the border area were reported during the summer, but the latest report indicates that rail and truck traffic along the border has decreased during the past two months. The scarcity of reliable information on this area precludes a definite conclusion as to the significance of the reported recent military activity, and it is probable that at least some of the movement and reported concentrations are connected with maneuvers. It also appears that the Soviets have increased their logistical capabilities on the Iranian-Turkish border this year. The Soviet troops in the Transcaucasus are considered adequate for initiating an invasion of Iran without advance warning. Some of these troops possibly have been deployed somewhat closer to the border.

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f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities in Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East. An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.
- (2) There are no firm indications of preparations for unusual military movements in these areas, although there are some indications that additional Soviet troops may arrive in Hungary and that military activity opposite the Iranian border has been intensified.
- (3) The size and combat effectiveness of the Eastern European Satellite armies are definitely increasing but these developments do not indicate a probability of imminent operations by these armies.
- (4) Increased harassment of the Western Powers in Germany may be a preliminary to a new Soviet move in Berlin but there are no firm indications of Soviet intentions.



JOHN WECKERLING

Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee

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Capt F. L. Greaves, G-2
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